Kai Spiekermann

Content
Epistemic Democracy
Social Media, Data, and Political Theory
Social Epistemology and Political Epistemology
Self-Serving Biases and Social Moral Epistemology
Social Ontology
Lotteries and Social Risk

Are democratic forms of government justified because democracies are better at "tracking the truth" than any other conceivable form of government? To what extent can the aggregation of distributed information improve collective decision making, and does "the wisdom of crowds" exist? In joint research with Franz Dietrich, Bob Goodin and Christian List I investigate these questions. We are particularly interested in the applicability and limitations of the jury theorems. While most people have encountered Condorcet’s classical jury theorem, it comes with significant drawbacks in terms of unrealistic premises and conclusions. Franz Dietrich and I developed a set of new jury theorems with more realistic premises and conclusions. Here are some core publications within this project:

I intend to build up a research programme on digital technology, data collections, artificial intelligence (AI), and political theory. Among the questions to be tackled are: 1. If data is the “oil” driving new technology industries, who should own data, how should we regulate the use of open access data, and should data use be taxed? 2. Given the amount of real-time data available, actors with wide access to data and data-processing AI can derive very precise knowledge about individuals. Should we limit which data may be aggregated for what purpose and by which type of AI systems? 3. The owners of social networks have become major institutional designers, without much democratic oversight. How can political theory provide guidance for new regulation? 4. The ability to encourage or discourage the creation of links between different individuals gives social networks influence over social choices. How should this new power be kept in check? 5. Should we allow AI agents to participate in the public sphere, and under which conditions? Relevant publications in this project are:

My interest in jury theorems has expanded into a wider interest in how collectives can acquire knowledge, how individuals acquire knowledge in social settings, and how social knowledge acquisition processes can fail. I have put particular emphasis on the role of instiutions, the importance and pitfalls of deliberation, and the influence of peers. In recent work, I have coined the term “Epistemic Network Injustice” to describe a situation in which agents are deprived of epistemically advantageous peer connections. Some publications in this project are here:

How do individuals respond to social norms if what the norm demands depends on what they know about the situation? By strategically avoiding some and seeking other information, individuals are able to shape the normative context they operate in to their advantage. In joint experimental and theoretical work with Arne Weiss, I have investigated the interaction between norms and knowledge acquisition. We find experimental evidence for strategic information uptake. We show in a formal model that one potential source of such strategic incentives is the relatively coarse definition of social norms.

I have worked on the individualism-holism debate, group agency, and on the aggregation of small and imperceptible effects. Together with Christian List, I have investigated the role of holism and individualism in political science and the social sciences in general. Our paper in the American Political Science Review shows that there are perfectly respectable forms of explanatory holism. Whether explanatory holism or individualism is appropriate is a largely empirical question. The paper clarifies the notions of holism and individualism by drawing on philosophical analyses of causation and the philosophy of mind. I also have a wider interest in the possibility and limits of group agency and on aggregation effects when individual effects are miniscule. Here are some recent publications:

Why do we find lotteries fair when allocating indivisible goods to claimants with similar claims to the scarce good? In joint work with Alex Voorhoeve, I develop a new theory of lottery fairness. We argue that the fairness of lotteries partly depends on the reasons it can provide to the loser of the allocation process.